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Teaching Opportunity Cost in an Emissions Permit Experiment 
Charles Holt, Erica Myers, Markus Wråke, Svante Mandell, and Dallas Burtraw 
Abstract 
This paper describes an individual choice experiment that can be used to teach students how to 
correctly account for opportunity costs in production decisions. Students play the role of producers who 
require a fuel input and an emissions permit for production. Given fixed market prices, they make 
production quantity decisions on the basis of their costs. Permits have a constant price throughout the 
experiment. In one treatment, students have to purchase both a fuel input and an emissions permit for 
each production unit. In a second treatment, they receive permits for free, and any unused permits are sold 
on their behalf at the permit price. If students correctly incorporate opportunity costs, they will have the 
same supply function in both treatments. This experiment motivates classroom discussion of opportunity 
costs and emissions permit allocation under cap-and-trade schemes. The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme provides a relevant example for classroom discussion, as industry earned significant 
windfall profits from free allocation of emissions allowances in the early phases of the program.  
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Teaching Opportunity Cost in an Emissons Permit Experiment 
Charles Holt, Erica Myers, Markus Wråke, Svante Mandell, and Dallas Burtraw∗ 
Introduction 
The notion of opportunity cost is pervasive in economics, and it is one of the first 
“principles” encountered by students in an introductory microeconomics class. A typical 
example is given in terms of the alternative earnings potential of a self-employed manager or 
farmer, in which the accounting profit of the business can be converted into an economic loss 
when the opportunity cost of self-employment is considered. Most students readily agree with 
the reasoning in this example, and yet experience with simulations of actual decisions reveals 
that many of them fail to incorporate opportunity costs into other decisions correctly. This paper 
presents a class experiment in an environmental frame in which interpersonal earnings 
comparisons can be used to show that those with low earnings can improve their earnings 
dramatically by basing decisions on a correct cost measure that includes opportunity cost. The 
key insight is that if tradable permits for greenhouse gases or other emissions are provided free to 
producers in a process called “grandfathering,” then the producer’s cost should include the 
opportunity cost of the permits, which is what they can sell for in an open market. This 
experiment takes about 30 minutes to run, and about 15 minutes should be allocated to 
discussion. It can be used for courses in introductory and intermediate microeconomics as well 
as courses in environmental economics. 
Procedures 
The experiment can be run by hand by providing students with a table of variable fuel 
costs for each of their capacity units and by giving them endowments of permits and telling them 
what unused permits can be sold for in an external permit market. The students then decide 
whether to operate each of their capacity units at a market price for the product that is announced 
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by the instructor. The process can be repeated several times with different market prices to obtain 
points on a supply function, and earnings can be compared so that students can see that the 
person with the highest earnings had a supply function that is shifted up due to the opportunity 
cost of the grandfathered permits being “built in.” Instructions for the hand-run version can be 
brief:  
You are a producer with 3 capacity units, shown in column (1) of the 
table. You require a fuel input and an emissions “permit” to produce each unit, 
and if you do produce a unit, you will sell the output at a price that can be entered 
for each of your three capacity units in column (2) when it is announced each 
round. For any unit that you decide to produce, you will incorporate a fuel cost 
shown in column (3). The first unit costs $1 to operate (think of these numbers in 
terms of millions of dollars). The second capacity unit costs $3 to operate, and the 
third costs $5 to operate. You have been given, free of charge, 3 permits that must 
be used or sold in this production period, i.e. no banking of permits for future 
periods is allowed. You indicate your permit use decisions for each capacity unit 
by circling a 0 or a 1 in column (4). Any unused permits will be automatically 
sold in a national emissions permit market for a price of $3. If you use a permit, 
you receive the difference between price and fuel cost, which can be entered in 
column (5). Your earnings for the period consist of the sum of the difference 
between price and cost in column (5), plus $3 for each of your unused permits.  





Price (at which 






Permits Used  
(1 permit needed for each 
capacity unit operated) 
(5) 
Price – Fuel Cost  
(0 if no permit 
used) 
1st  $  $1  0 or 1   
2nd  $  $3  0 or 1   
3rd  $  $5  0 or 1   
  Sum of price–cost differences for units operated:   
  Earnings on unused permits sold at $3 each:    
  Total earnings for the production period:   Resources for the Future  Holt et al. 
3 
For the hand-run version, the instructor will want to copy and distribute earnings tables 
for a number of periods and to make a template for graphing supply functions over a range of 
prices from 1 to 9. To avoid indifference, use prices in 50-cent increments, for example, a 
randomly ordered mix of prices such as $1.50, $2.50, $3.50, … $8.50. Decision tables should be 
copied in advance and distributed when the instructions are read aloud.  
This experiment can also be run online by using the Veconlab software.1 The software 
provides instructions, tabulates individual decisions and earnings, and creates graphs of observed 
supply functions for the class as a whole, for the person with the highest earnings, and for the 
person with the lowest earnings. Since this is an individual decision experiment, it can either be 
run after hours, with students logging in from home, or in class with students who bring laptops 
to class (those without laptops can sit next to those with laptops). It is not necessary to pick one 
person randomly to receive their earnings, but if you announce that you will do so in advance, 
the number of laptops in class will increase dramatically. The online version also permits a wide 
array of setup options. In particular, there can be a second treatment without grandfathering (i.e., 
all permits are purchased at their market value of $3) in which observed behavior typically 
conforms more closely to the theoretical supply curve. 
To run the online version, you need to have internet connections, but no special software 
or add-ins are required. Begin by navigating to the admin menu (Google “Veconlab admin”). If 
not done previously, you should register and select a username and password. Students do not 
need to register, but when they join a session they will be assigned an identification (ID) number. 
The instructor username consists of several letters, (e.g., cat), and each separate “session” you 
run with a class will have a number appended (e.g., cat1, cat2, etc.). Select the Markets menu and 
click on Production Cost to begin setup. After you enter your username and password, you will 
see a list of sessions (if any) that you have run with previous classes. You may overwrite data in 
an existing session (e.g., cat3) or you may create a new session from the blank one at the bottom 
of the list.  
On the first setup page, enter the maximum number of participants (it’s okay if fewer 
login) and the following selections: Number of Treatments (2), Product Market (fixed price, 
NOT BDM), Number of Capacity Units (3), Terminology (environmental), Entry Decision 
(automatic), Input A Variable Cost (deterministic), Input B Price (deterministic), Input C Cost 
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(deterministic), and Product Prices (prespecified). These default settings implement a two-
treatment setup with 8 decision rounds each. It is best to keep with the default setting of “go at 
your own pace” and to let students see each other’s earnings, identified by ID, in the second half 
of each treatment. There are 3 capacity units with fuel costs that match those for the handrun 
version above. Leave capacity costs set at 0, with a forced entry decision (meaning that their 
capacity is given), so that the automatic supply function graphs will apply. Product prices are set 
in 50-cent intervals to span the relevant range. In treatment 1, the student is endowed with 2 
permits, so a third must be purchased at $3 if 3 units are operated, and unused permits can be 
sold for $3. In the second treatment, the permit endowments are set at $0. Click through to the 
page where you can watch students log in. That page has a View Results button, which takes you 
to an aggregate results page where you can continue to watch logins, read instructions from the 
Instructions button, or view the supply function from the Graph button.  
With the suggested setup defaults, the graph should show the template for a supply 
function; if not, it is probably because you did not set the Product Market to be “fixed price” or 
because you changed the capacity cost or entry settings. If you use the back arrow to adjust 
settings, subjects who have already logged in will have to do so again, so it is better to check the 
instructions and graph before class. If you set up from your office before class, you can use the 
View link on the admin menu and enter the session name (e.g., cat1) and your password to get to 
the results pages in the classroom without setting up again. Students log in from the top button 
on their login link (Google “Veconlab login”); all they need to know is the session name (e.g., 
cat1) that you used on setup, and they may select their own passwords, which would only be 
needed if they become disconnected and need to use the Emergency Restart button at the bottom 
of their login page.  
As decisions are made, the results page shows the “efficiency” percentages of maximum 
earnings for each person’s decisions and the average efficiency by round. The graph page allows 
you to show or hide the supply function, and to show results for specific individuals by using the 
Show ID button and selecting the individual by ID. When a person has finished all rounds, the 
Show ID select menu lists earnings and identifies the IDs with the minimum and maximum 
earnings.  
 Resources for the Future  Holt et al. 
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Classroom Discussion 
Students are typically interested in who earned the most, and a class discussion can begin 
with a discussion of relative earnings. If the class default settings are used, the Graph page of the 
Veconlab software has a select menu that lists all participant IDs and their earnings and identifies 
the minimum and maximum earnings. You can connect your computer to a projector in order to 
share the results with the class. This lets you project the supply behavior of selected individuals 
for each treatment, as shown in Figure 1 for a particular student (ID2) for the first treatment. This 
student had the lowest overall earnings for a group of intermediate microeconomics students. 
This person consistently supplied too many units to the market, as indicated by the dots being 
below the supply function, which incorporates the opportunity cost of the grandfathered permits. 
Of the three dots on the predicted supply function, two were at prices of $7.50 and $8.50, for 
which both of the grandfathered permits should be sold anyway, even if one failed to incorporate 
opportunity cost. Overall, this student only earned $60.50, relative to the maximum earnings of 
$83 achieved by those with the highest earnings. One of the most effective points to make in the 
class discussion is that a correct accounting for opportunity cost could have raised earnings by 
over 33 percent for this person. The decisions for the person with the highest earnings will 
typically generate dots that trace the predicted supply curve.  
Figure 1. Supply Decisions with Grandfathering of a Student with Low Earnings 
 
It is often easier to let students go at their own pace in a classroom experiment of this 
type, but the result is that the relative earnings information is not available to the first person who Resources for the Future  Holt et al. 
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makes each decision, and even the second and third people to finish may not see many other 
earnings results with which to make comparisons. Nevertheless, class discussion indicates that 
relative earnings can help some people to realize that units should not be sold below the sum of 
the fuel cost and the opportunity cost of a permit. 
The initial allocation of allowances in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) for CO2 emissions provides an illustrative example for class discussion. Note that 
when opportunity cost is included correctly, the supply function is the same whether or not 
permits are grandfathered. When the initial allocation for the EU ETS program was being 
discussed, one argument put forward by electric power producers was basically “if you make us 
pay for permits, we will end up raising the price for electricity.” You should read this argument 
to the students and ask them to evaluate it. If they have understood the implications of their 
experiment, they should conclude that the price of electricity will rise regardless of whether 
allocations are free (grandfathering) or made by selling permits. This is because the scarcity of 
permits results in a positive price for permits in the resale market, and this price is the basis of 
the opportunity cost of a permit. Next, ask them to evaluate the alternative of grandfathering 
versus permit sales on producer profits (you may want to report the average earnings in each 
experimental treatment if two treatments were used). Finally, you can note that the EU initially 
adopted a policy of grandfathering, with auctions limited to at most five percent of permits for 
each country. This resulted in windfall profits for producers, at least while permits remained 
scarce, and the result was some public dissatisfaction with the cap-and-trade system. Ensuing 
criticisms have led the European Commission to reconsider the use of free allocation. Plans are 
in place to auction most of the allowances that will be used by the power sector beginning in 
2013 and to auction to most other covered emissions sources by 2020. Auctioning of emissions 
allowances has emerged as a key feature of most legislative proposals for climate policy in the 
United States. President Obama’s first proposed budget plan included revenues that would result 
from auctioning a majority of the allowances under a CO2 cap-and-trade program. 
Further Reading 
Empirical analyses show that there has been significant pass through of emissions 
allowance costs in the relatively competitive EU electricity markets. Bunn and Fezzi (2007) 
found that consumers in the U.K. electricity market pay for a significant portion of the value of 
emissions allowances that industry has mostly received for free. Fell (2008) analyzed the Nordic 
electricity market and had similar findings. Resources for the Future  Holt et al. 
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In several cases, EU governmental authorities have taken action against firms for passing 
through too much of the economic value of the allowances given to them for free. The German 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) sent a warning letter
2 to RWE3 in 2006 charging that its 
industrial electricity prices were abusive because the company had passed on more than 25 
percent of the CO2 emissions allowance value to electricity prices. More recently, the Belgian 
energy market regulator, CREG, stated authorities “must act to prevent utilities from making 
windfall profits by passing on the cost of carbon emission rights to consumers,” citing a finding 
that Belgian energy producers made close to 1.2 billion euros between 2005 and 2007 by 
charging customers for allowances that they had received for free.4 The intuition that free 
allocation will not raise direct costs of production and therefore should not lead to higher 
consumer prices appears to be deeply ingrained in some members of the public, policy makers, 
and industry.  
Wråke et al. (2009) use an individual choice experimental setup similar to the one 
described above to investigate students’ understanding of opportunity cost in an emissions permit 
market. They find that many participants do not recognize opportunity costs initially, but that 
they learn over time and that learning can be accelerated by relative profit information. An 
interesting extension in the paper was the administration of a cognitive reflection test at the end 
of the experiment. According to Frederick (2005), the test measures “‘cognitive reflection’—the 
ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind.” Wråke et al. 
(2009) find that those who earned higher profits in the experiment also performed better on the 
cognitive reflection test, highlighting that the concept of opportunity cost is intuitively difficult 
and not initially obvious to some observers. 
Classroom experiments can also be illustrative for learning about market failures and 
externalities. Anderson and Stafford (2000) describe a classroom experiment that uses an 
emissions trading scheme with a double auction. Students learn that the initial allocation of 
property rights will not affect the efficiency of the program but will have dramatic effects on the 
distribution of gains and losses. Kilkenny (2000) outlines a classroom experiment that illustrates 
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the concept of externalities and the efficiency tradable permits relative to Pigouvian taxes for 
internalizing those costs. She suggests a creative way to demonstrate pollution externalities by 
having students who have been affected wear bags on their heads.  
In the experiment we describe here, students make production quantity decisions on the 
basis of a fixed market price. The experiment could equivalently be run with students specifying 
the lowest price they would be willing to accept for each production unit. As with the quantity 
choice environment, the market price is randomly determined. Students receive the market price 
for production units where their specified price is below the market price. This mechanism is 
known as Becker–DeGroot–Marshak (BDM) (Becker et al. 1964). Bidding along the price 
dimension rather than the quantity dimension is more directly analogous to electricity pricing. 
However, it is sometimes difficult for students to recognize that the BDM mechanism is 
incentive compatible; this difficulty can detract from the true goal of the lesson, which is to 
understand opportunity cost.  
As with the notion of opportunity costs, sunk costs can also be difficult for students in 
beginning and intermediate microeconomics classes to account for correctly in production 
decisions. An interesting extension of the experiment described in this paper would be to run 
treatments in which there is a cost to enter the market (the setting for this is “Entry Decision”). 
Experiments with both sunk costs and BDM price mechanism are available by using the 
Veconlab software described above. 
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